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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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25X1

1952 PLANS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF RUMANIAN COAL INDUSTRY

Comment: The following report, taken from Rumanian newspapers, gives information on the production achievements and difficulties of the Rumanian coal industry, as well as proposed solutions. In June and July 1952, according to the Rumanian press, many complaints were made against the Ministry of Coal and Petroleum Industries, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Wood, Paper, and Cellulose Industries in regard to difficulties in the coal industry. It is interesting to note in this connection various ministerial changes that occurred in the ministries which were under criticism. For example, Mihai Szuder was placed in charge of the Ministry of Wood, Paper, and Cellulose Industries in place of Constantin Frisnea (Scanteia 30 May 1952). Octavian Berlogea was appointed Minister of Health in place of Vasile Marza, who was declared unsuitable and negligent (Scanteia 12 August 1952). On 26 August, Scanteia reported that the Ministry of Coal and Petroleum Industries had been divided into the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries and the Ministry of Coal Industry. Viliam Szuder was appointed Minister of Coal Industry.

The problems of coal were brought into prominence in the press when Gheorghiu-Dej met with a committee of 40 Rumanian miners in Bucharest in mid-June 1952 to discuss difficulties in the industry. This was followed by a second conference at Petrosani at the end of June when further complaints and suggestions were heard from representatives of mines throughout the RPR (Rumanian People's Republic) and the government policy for improvement was stated. On 4 July, a decree of the Council of Ministers incorporated into law the proposals made by Gheorghiu-Dej at the second conference. In June and July, the Rumanian press published reports from individual mines on local conditions. An examination of reports made at the conferences, together with those appearing in newspapers, gives a general picture of the coal-mining industry.

25X1

- 1 -

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The following list shows the chief Rumanian coal mines, as mentioned in the newspapers examined for this report, with their production plan fulfillments in percentage and their principal products when mentioned.

<u>Location</u>	<u>Product</u>	<u>Period</u>	<u>Percentage of Fulfillment</u>	<u>Source</u>
<u>Bihor Regiune</u>				
Derna-Tatarus State Coal Enterprise	Anthracite, bituminous coal	Jan-Jun 52	Plan not fulfilled	(1)
		May-Jun 52	104	(2)
			24*	(3)
Cornitel				(4)
Derna				
Budoi				
Tatarus				(2)
Sarmasag Coal Basin	Coal, lignite	Jan-Jun 52	102.2	(5)
		May-Jun 52	104	(2)
		Jan-Jun 52	10 days ahead of schedule	(6)
		Jan-Jun 52	105 <i>[sic]</i>	(2)
			200*	(3)
<u>Cluj Regiune</u>				
Rosia Montana				(7)
Jibou Raion				(8)
Sorecani State Coal Enterprise	Coal, thin layers of brown coal	Jan-Mar 52	103	
		Apr 52	101	
		May 52	94.2	
7 Noemtrie		Jun 52	92	(2)
Curturis		Jul 52	153.7	(9)
Almas Coal Basin		1951 plan in 11 months		
		Jan-Mar 52	103	
		Apr-Jun 52	96	(2)
<u>Hunedoara Regiune</u>				
Valea Jiului				
Aninoasa			133	(10)
Lupeni				
Vulcan				
Jieti-Lonea	Coal		186	(10)
Petrila				(2)
Petrosani				
Teben				(11)

*Percent of increased production 1948 - 1952

- 2 -

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25X1

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<u>Location</u>	<u>Product</u>	<u>Period</u>	<u>Percentage of Fulfillment</u>	<u>Source</u>
<u>Timisoara Regiune</u>				
Anina	Coal	52	Nonfulfillment	(2, 3)
Sinersig	Lignite			(12)
Doman				
Secul			152.7	(13)
<u>Prahova Regiune</u>				
Filipesti-de-Padure State Coal Enterprise	Coal			
Valea-Palangii	Very thin strata			
Margineanca				
Margineanca No 3	Lignite	Jan-Jun 52	94	(2)
Doicesti				
Sotanga				(13)
<u>Arges Regiune</u>				
Schitu-Golesti Coal Basin	Lignite, coal	Jan-Mar 52 Apr-May 52	101 Nonfulfillment	(3, 2)
Poenari	Coal	Apr-May 52	Nonfulfillment	
Godeni	Coal	Apr-May 52	Nonfulfillment	
Berevoiesti	Coal, lignite			
Pescareasa		Jan-Jun 52	124	(3)
<u>Stalin Regiune</u>				
Codlea				
1 Mai				(14)
Capeni				
Vulcan				(2)
<u>Suceava Regiune</u>				
Campulung-Muscel				(15)
<u>Bacau Regiune</u>				
Comanesti	Coal	Jan-Jun 52	96.66	
Rafira		May 52	120	
Galton				
Lumina				
Valea Trostului				(14)
<u>Buzau Regiune</u>				
Cisla				(16)
<u>Unidentified Regiune</u>				
Ojasca				(10,14)

- 3 -

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25X1

CONFIDENTIALAchievements in Coal-Mining Industry

Gheorghiu-Dej reported achievements in the coal-mining industry in his speech before the second miners' conference at the beginning of July, as follows:

In 1951, coal production was 17.9 percent greater than in 1950. The 1951 wages of the miners were 1.5 times that of 1938. The increase in real wages was even greater. Investments in the coal-mining industry increased. Thus, in 1949 investments for economic and sociological factors totaled 62,100,000 old lei. Those of Sovromcarbune alone were 24,400,000 old lei. In 1951, investments in the entire industry were 267,900,000; those of Sovromcarbune were 145,400,000. In 1952, the total investments amounted to 357,400,000 and those of Sovromcarbune 310,600,000 old lei.

The level of public health facilities also increased. In 1952, there were three hospitals and 14 dispensaries for miners. There was also a greater amount of living space provided. More than 175,000 square meters of living area were available. In Valea Jiului, for example, there were 64 apartments and four cultural halls in 1950. This increased to 118 apartments and 18 cultural halls in 1951. By the end of 1952 there will be 900 apartments. In Comanesti and other regions 128 dwellings were constructed in 1950 and 246 dwellings were added in 1951. There is now a theater in Valea Jiului and numerous cultural and artistic teams have been trained. The area has been made accessible by the construction of the new Bumbesti-Livezeni railroad. A new road has opened up the Valea Trososului. In 1952, more than 7,000 miners are to be sent to vacation centers. The food and industrial goods supplies have been improved at 89 state stores. A seniority system, progressive wages, prizes, and decorations were introduced among miners.(16)

Other examples of achievements in the coal mining industry as reported by the Rumanian press are as follows:

The Derna-Tatarus State Coal Enterprise has continually increased production. New mines have been opened. Electric power stations are being set up for heavy work. Rail lines are being constructed to facilitate transport, and individual miners regularly exceed quotas.(1)


However, until recently, the Filipestii-de-Padure State Coal Enterprise carried on mining in a primitive manner. Now, it uses machinery produced domestically or imported from the USSR.(17) Dozens of scrapers, mechanical cutters, and screw conveyors are used to raise and transport coal. A special combine for thin strata has recently been received from the USSR. Underground transport is 70 percent mechanized, and surface transport, 80 percent. The first 35-horsepower diesel mine locomotives to be produced in the RPR are now in use.(18) Transport to the surface is 100 percent mechanized at the entire enterprise. Machines in the central shaft assure rapid removal of coal. New lathes have been acquired and a modern repair shop established to maintain the equipment.

In the first 5 months of 1952 the investment plan was fulfilled 134.2 percent. Labor productivity rose 8.5 percent from January to May 1952.(17)

New successes in the domestic production of mine machinery were evident. For example, in 1952, various types of wet drills and mine locomotives were produced for the first time.(19) Emil Klamancsek, director of Petrila mines reported that mechanization in his enterprise was 70.94 percent greater than in 1948 as a result of increased domestic equipment and of tools imported from the USSR. The latter category includes electric compressors, electric

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25X1

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and pneumatic loading machinery, scrapers, electric locomotives for underground transport, electric cranes, pneumatic drills, electric transformers and lamps, ventilators, and other tools obtained through Sovromcarbune. As a result of new ventilation and safety measures, not a single explosion occurred in the mines in 1951.(20)

All work was mechanized at 7 Noemtrie, principal mine of Sorecani State Coal Enterprise.(2) At Comanesti the installation of a compressor in June 1952 assured the success of the cyclic graph method and permitted labor productivity to increase 25-40 percent.(3) Mines such as Vulcan, considered exhausted and unprofitable by private enterprise, were reopened with the aid of machinery.(14)

Miners of Rosia Montana have enjoyed a higher standard of living than ever before because of improvements in food and supply.(7)

Difficulties in Coal-Mining Industry

Difficulties and errors in the coal-mining industry were brought to the attention of Gheorghiu-Dej by a committee of 40 miners at the first mining conference held in mid-June. Miners, representing the chief enterprises in the RPR made complaints about the poor food supply, inadequate living quarters, lack of mine cars, poor miner timbers, vital need for trained personnel, errors in the organization of competitions, and ineffective political work.(14)

Difficulties in the coal-mining industry were again discussed by Gheorghiu-Dej, and miners at the second conference. Such difficulties discussed at the two conferences and subsequently by the July press included the deviationism of Vasile Luca, neglect of the industry by ministries and directorates, financial difficulties, poor union operations, poor management, inadequate transport facilities, poor maintenance and supply of equipment, lack of power, labor procurement and personnel troubles, poor food supply, poor health and protective measures, insufficient living quarters, and lack of cultural facilities, as follows:

1. Deviationism

The deviationism of Vasile Luca, Ana Pauker, and Teohari Georgescu complicated the entire mining situation, according to Gheorghiu-Dej. Insufficient vigilance against hostile elements occurred on all levels. Saboteurs crept into organs of the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum. Hostile elements attempted to sabotage the Five-Year Plan. This was evidenced by the disorganization of normal exploitation, by poor application of technological processes, by failure to take measures for the safety and protection of workers, by disorganization of transport, and by the sabotaging of new tools.(16) Emil Klamancsek, director of the Petrila mines declared that the deviation of Luca, Pauker, and Georgescu was reflected in his enterprise by an unjustified reduction in turnover capital, and the failure to obtain investment funds on time.(20)

2. Ministerial Neglect

According to Gheorghiu-Dej, the ministries and directorates neglected the coal-mining industry. The Ministry of Coal and Petroleum Industries did not give enough support to organization and did nothing to liquidate errors. The ministry failed to procure sufficient manpower, to maintain labor discipline, and to train personnel. The heads of the ministry were more interested in petroleum than in coal.(16) Stanislav Antochia Ratoi explained that inspectors of the Ministry of Coal and Petroleum Industries did

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25X1

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not speak to workers at all and thus were not aware of complaints. N. Dari-ciu of the Schitu Golesti mine complained of the lack of vigilance of the General Directorate of Coal and of the ministry.(3)

The Ministry of Health was said to have neglected health and labor welfare.(2) The Council of Ministers in a decree of 4 July 1952 ordered the Ministry of Coal and Petroleum Industries to report to the Council of Ministers on plans for the mechanization of mining by 15 November 1952, on the training of personnel by 15 November 1952, on organizational measures by 1 November 1952, and on proposals for a planning institute by 15 September 1952.(21)

3. Poor Union Operation

The lack of collaboration between unions and enterprise management was in part responsible for the failure of production plans, said Anton Raica of the Anina mine in Timisoara.(2) Mihail Mujic, member of the executive bureau of the General Confederation of Labor explained that the deficiencies in the coal mining industry would have been less if the union organizations had been more concerned with the problems of the coal industry. He claimed that the executive committees of coal unions had concerned themselves only with the publication of pamphlets and the presentation of talks; that the unions had "divorced themselves from life" and had failed to deal with concrete problems; that they had failed to encourage the use of the cyclic graph and other Soviet methods, and had failed to urge the adoption of the Nicolae Vasu and Vasile Dicu innovations. As a remedy, Mujic urged unionists to become acquainted with the economic and technical aspects of coal production; to push cultural and educational work, and to maintain revolutionary vigilance.(22)

4. Poor Management

In his speech to the miners, Gheorghiu-Dej declared that coal production fell behind the needs of industry because of poor management, as shown by the following conditions: Many mistakes were made in the management of enterprises and ministries. There was a general lack of materials, tools, and labor. The productivity of available labor did not increase in proportion to the mechanization of processes. Work was poorly organized and labor discipline was poor. Mine equipment suppliers, such as Strugul and Union, failed to respect delivery schedules. Enterprise technical organizations did not concern themselves sufficiently with the preparation of reserve faces. Those of Ojasca, Capeni, and Cisla persisted in using old methods instead of the longwall method. Some technical organizations did not apply labor protection measures. Only 47 percent of all miners participated in the competitions. Administrations and technical managers did not supply faces with cars for removal of coal. Planned economy was not used in mines and enforcement of the Five-Year Plan was poor.(16)

Other examples of poor management cited in the press are as follows:

The Jieti-Lonea mine in Valea-Jiului remained behind in its production schedule. This was due chiefly to a series of mistakes made by administration, the party committee, and the enterprise committee. They failed to carry out the orders of the General Directorate of Sovromcarbune. The management of the mine did not prepare its plans well, either for exploitation or development of new faces. Often the management assigned all miners to exploitation in an effort to meet the production schedule, and thus neglected development. There was no repair plan. Transportation was not well organized. The party committee was not active and the enterprise committee did not make serious efforts to organize competitions. In addition, the enterprise committee failed to popularize Soviet methods and Stakhanovite experiences.(23)

- 6 -

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25X1

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Errors by the administration of the Derna-Tatarus State Coal Enterprise resulted in failure to fulfill the production plan. Primary party organizations were not able to draw all miners into competitions for the fulfillment of the plan. They were not familiarized with the plan and thus could not fight as individuals to surpass quotas. The great majority of miners, workers, technicians, and engineers did not know their specific duties nor the over-all plan requirements. For example, at the Cernitel mine, the section chief did not receive the plan for the second quarter of 1952 until 17 May. Miners of Derna, Budoi, Tatarus, and other sections did not learn their individual quotas on time. Contracts for socialist competition were of a generalized nature and failed to specify particular objectives. The quality of work was not emphasized.

In many cases miners agreed to "surpass the norm," or "achieve economies," without any mention of what the norms were or how economies were to be achieved. Another serious error was the fact that no Stakhanovite was confirmed. The proper conditions were not created for leading workers to become Stakhanovites.

In January 1952 the administration of the Derna-Tatarus State Coal Enterprise embarked on a program of technical organizational measures. These included the most efficient use of mine timbers and underground and surface transport to save work time. This program failed. The enterprise management also failed to carry on a concerted campaign for conservation of materials.

The waste prevalent in the bituminous coal plan is an example. A coal-tar boiler leaked, spreading vapors over the surrounding area. Significant quantities of coal tar and oil were thus lost. Director Filip Nicolae, the man chiefly responsible, was warned that this would happen, but took no preventative measures. Distilled oil was handled carelessly and allowed to flow freely. Technicians and engineers confined themselves to office work instead of dealing with concrete problems. Consequently, accidents and errors resulted in the loss of hundreds of tons of coal and caused higher production costs. The General Directorate of Coal and the Ministry of Coal and Petroleum Industries failed to support the administration in such matters. For example, the enterprise did not have a technical manager for 9 months.(1)

At Schitu-Golesti technicians such as Engineers Ivancovici [fnu], Ciucu [fnu], Georgescu [fnu], and Voinoveanu [fnu] did not concern themselves with work problems. Soviet methods were not introduced properly and Stakhanovites were not recognized. Inspectors of the General Directorate of Coal showed no interest in solving such problems. At Sarmasag and Derna-Tatarus competitions were not successful. Workers were not properly indoctrinated. The exchange of experiences between leading workers, and the support of Stakhanovites was poor. Organization of competitions at Anina was poor. Plan preparation was unsatisfactory at the Sorecani State Coal Enterprise. Mining enterprises of Prahova Regiune organized competitions in a bureaucratic manner. Marginaneanca No 3, for example, fulfilled its plan only 94 percent, in part because of the failure to institute competitions. At the second miners' conference Vasile Farasan declared that more emphasis on competitions was necessary at Codlea.(2) Managements of mines in Comanesti did not give enough support to the miners.(3)

5. Transportation Difficulties

Stakhanovites and leading workers reported to Gheorghiu-Dej that transportation underground and on the surface was inadequate. The following examples were cited.

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25X1

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Tiberiu-Harco of the Sorecani State Coal Enterprise stated that the enterprise suffered from a lack of vehicles. Constantin Damian of Timisoara Regiune reported on the poor organization of transportation at Sinersig, Doman, Secul, and Anina.(2) Antohie Ratoi said that transport for workers and for coal was needed at Anina.(3) The Filipesti-de-Padure and Sotanga mines have very limited transportation facilities on the surface.(2)

The lack of a railroad to Poenar, Godeni, and Berevoesti forces miners to transport coal manually. The lack of mine cars forces loaders to be idle for hours. The ministry was called upon for aid, but failed to respond.(3) Means for transporting workers to the mines were needed in the Schitu-Golesti Coal Basin.(2) Lack of cars and diesels was chiefly responsible for the failures to fulfill plans.(24)

Following the second miners conference, newspapers continued to point out transportation difficulties as follows: The number of cars at Lupeni was inadequate to meet the demands of the mine.(9)

Jiet-Lonea mine No III had particular difficulty with transport and efforts to improve the situation were unsuccessful. There was no rational use of underground cars nor were they maintained in repair. The checking of electric locomotives is unsystematic. For example, on 4 June, locomotive No 3 was returned to service by the repair shop but it broke down again after a few hundred meters of use. As a result, the entire mine achieved only 29 percent of planned production on 4 June. Locomotive No 2 broke down on 25 June immediately after repair. Technician Benedict Crisan, chief of transport, is responsible for poor organization of repair. Engineer Adalbert Sultz, chief of the electric mechanical service, is responsible for the poor repair work.(25)

6. Inadequate Equipment and Maintenance

Equipment was in short supply and maintenance was poor according to Stakhanovites and leading workers at the second conference. The following examples of inadequate equipment and maintenance were found in the newspapers surveyed for this report.

The Comanesti Coal Enterprise successfully installed a compressor at the Rafira mine. This compressor served 30 drills and permitted the mine to fulfill its May plan 120 percent. However, this was one of the few bright spots in the Comanesti equipment picture.(14) Poor equipment delivered by Unic of Satu-Mare caused trouble. Engineers did not do enough to introduce new work methods, using the excuse that they lacked tools.(3)

Repair of equipment required too much time. For example, at the Galion Mine of Comanesti, two drills were not repaired for 2 weeks because of the negligence of Engineer Stefanche (fmu). At the Lumina mine seven pneumatic drills could not be used for 2 weeks because Engineer Popescu failed to have them repaired. Gasoline lamps were not properly maintained. Some masters failed to inspect the lamps and thus they burned only 2 hours instead of 8. The lack of tools and their improper maintenance explains in part why Comanesti fulfilled its production plan only 96.7 percent and remained behind schedule in the preparation of new mine faces.(14)

At Sector IV of Jieti-Lonea in Valea Giului miners were hampered by the lack of cars and air hose. Proposals for improving the work were ignored and Engineer Ion Ungureanu failed to help overcome difficulties. There was no regular repair plan at the mine. Consequently, many groups of miners did not have the needed tools.(23) Lupeni did not plan blasting and failed to

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25X1

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provide enough dynamite so that time was lost waiting for a supply.(9, 24) Lupeni lacked mine timber of good quality. Many groups lost production time cutting timbers to correct dimensions. This work should have been done at the surface.(26) Despite large-scale mechanization at Lupeni production was not successful.

One of the reasons for the failure of Anina to fulfill its plan was the lack of cars, mine timbers, and other equipment. Chains were used for lifting coal because screw lifts were not available. There was a shortage of mine timbers throughout Schitu-Golesti. This was especially evident at Poenari.(2) The Poenari and Godeni mines did not fulfill April and May 1952 plans because of the lack of machinery, rails, and other equipment.(3) The Almas Coal Basin did not have the proper drills and equipment to work a very thin strata. Mines of Filipestii-de-Padure needed special tools and equipment for the exploitation of lignite. The Codlea and Capeni mines were short of antigas motors and lamps due to late deliveries by the General Directorate of Coal.(2) 1 Mai Mine of Codlea needed drills, mine hammers, drill bits, a source of air for pneumatic tools, and lamp burners.(27)

Mihai Szuder, Minister of Wood, Paper, and Cellulose Industries stated that poor work by the ministry and by industrial enterprises of the ministry /under his predecessor/ had made the work of the miner difficult and had placed handicaps on the development of coal mining. These enterprises did not supply enough miner timbers. Those which they did supply were thin and green. The management of units sought to hide the failure to deliver timbers. They forced mining enterprises to take a certain percentage of unusable wood as a condition for receiving quantities of acceptable wood. The Ministry of Wood, Paper, and Cellulose Industries, and the Ministry of Coal and Petroleum Industries were accessories, because they did nothing to remedy this situation.

Units under the Ministry of Wood, Paper, and Cellulose must correct errors in the supply of mine timbers because of the importance of coal mining, the need for these timbers to increase production, and for the protection of the health and lives of the miners.(28)

7. Lack of Power

Engineer Ion Tundrea reported to Gheorghiu-Dej that the Derna-Tatarus and Sarmasag enterprises of Bihor Regiune lacked electric power. This limited production during many months of the year. Despite this, the directorate and the ministry showed laxity in the delivery of electrogenous groups which were urgently needed.(3) At the conference Ioan Jiescu called for the electrification of Berevoiesti.(2)

8. Labor Problems

Stakhanovite Grigore Siller of the Petrila mines declared at the conference that there was a need for trained personnel. Youths, 18 years old or younger, working in the mines caused accidents because they were not sufficiently prepared. Workers did not know how to conserve explosives. Available trained workers were shifted about so often that they were not efficiently used. Better organization and training were necessary, particularly among youths working in the mines.(2)

Anina, the Sorecani State Coal Enterprise, the Lupeni mines, and the Schitu-Golesti Coal Basin lacked trained personnel, Gheorghiu-Dej was informed.(3, 2)

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25X1

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Press reports showed the following training and preparation program:

The chief of the Lupeni investments section stated that 70 percent of the workers in his sector were youths. They were being trained by older miners. A group of 63 were being prepared by the Kotlyar method as wagoneers, assistant miners, and miners. A second group of 32 were being trained as miners.(9) Work at Lupeni was poorly organized. Trained men were unevenly distributed. Some teams had too many, others not enough. The men were shifted too frequently from one spot to another, thus cutting efficiency. There were too many absences without cause. Consequently, in March, 22 brigades were below their norms. However, in April this was reduced to 12, and in May to one.(24) M. Angelescu reported at the second conference that in addition to absences and labor discipline problems at Lupeni, competitions were not spreading successfully.

At Comanesti engineers found it difficult to introduce new work methods because of the lack of trained personnel. To improve this situation a series of 38 technical lectures were presented.(3)

Sorecani instituted a series of training courses to overcome the shortage of trained miners. Forty-three men finished the minimum qualification course; 38 qualified as assistant miners, and five as miners. In addition, 19 team chiefs signed contracts to train 25 miners and assistant miners at work faces. There is a Stakhanovite school at the Curturis mine of Sorecani. Here, theoretical and practical lectures are given by Stakhanovites Ion Ciupea and Anton Gasparik. Seven men and three women finished a 6-month course qualifying them as underground mechanics.(13)

Intermediate mining schools are operating at Lupeni, Vulcan of Codlea, and Campulung-Muscel. These schools prepare students in general culture as well as in technical and specialized professional fields. Students work underground as part of their training and become acquainted with the life of the miner. At the intermediate school in Lupeni, students specialize in coal machinery courses taught in Rumanian or Hungarian, and in mine topography. The school in Vulcan, Stalin Regiune, develops specialists for exploiting coal strata. A mining school in Brad, Deva Raion, trains personnel for the exploitation and processing of minerals. Students receive scholarships and equipment. Graduates of the 4-year course can become intermediate technicians.(15)

Competitions to increase labor productivity were not successful in coal mining as a whole, although there were occasional successes, according to Ion Calin of the Marginea-Doicesti mines.(14) At Petriila, exploitation and labor productivity did not increase at the same rate as mechanization.(20) The cyclic graph method of increasing labor productivity was studied at Comanesti, but not applied because of the lack of perseverance of technical personnel. Pledges were only 96 percent fulfilled.(3) At Sarmasag the title of Stakhanovite, a strong incentive for increasing production and productivity was not granted to men who fully deserved it.(14) Labor discipline was poor in the Almas Basin.(2)

9. Food and Consumer Goods Shortage

At both meetings of mine representatives with Gheorghiu-Dej miners of the Comanesti State Coal Enterprise complained that their work suffered because of the poor food supply. State and cooperative stores maintained unbalanced stocks. Some articles of clothing and a number of foods such as edible pastes, sugar, and marmalade were overabundant; but basic foods, such as meat, fish, ham, and vegetables, were very rare. Meat arrived in poor condition. Only one store was established in Laloia. Consequently, there were always long waiting lines.(10, 3)

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25X1

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Food was entirely inadequate at Lonea. At 1 Mai, Codlea, the manager of the local cooperative was found to be a saboteur.(14) In Jibou Raion the cooperative could not provide many items of food to local miners.(8) The food supply in Bihor Regiune was sabotaged by the chief of the food supply section, a former colonel named Cladoiu [fny]. Vasile Farasan of Codlea complained to Gheorghiu-Dej that since the cooperative provided insufficient food and clothing miners were forced to buy from speculators.(2) There is no state store in the Almas Basin and the food supply is poor. Anton Raica declared that Anina lacked food. Francisc Covaci reported that mining enterprises in Prahova Regiune lacked food and industrial goods.

10. Poor Housing Facilities

The great need for housing in the coal-mining areas was discussed by representatives of Jieti-Lonea at the first miners conference (14), and by representatives of the Almas Basin at the second conference. According to Ioai N. Jiescu, funds were needed for housing in the Schitu-Golesti Basin. Mines in Bihor Regiune have difficulty in attracting new workers because of the lack of housing. The investment plan for regiune enterprises called for 300 new apartments for workers and technicians. However, only 65 were built in the entire regiune.(2) To meet the housing need at Petrila, 18 blocks of dwellings, two cultural halls, and a bathhouse have been erected.(20)

11. Health Needs

Reports from the various mining areas made at the two conferences indicated that health and safety measures were inadequate. Miners of Sorecani lacked waterproof and protective clothing. At Schitu-Golesti there were not enough doctors or medical technicians. Protective equipment, such as boots and shoes, were of poor quality. Jiescu, who reported this situation, declared that the Ministry of Health was falling down on the job and was doing nothing to remedy these conditions. At Codlea ventilation was poor, mechanical equipment was needed. Rubber boots were reported to be so poorly made that they lasted only a month.(2)

Gheorghiu-Dej stated at the July conference that errors had been made in disease prevention, in the organization of dietetic canteens, and in the operation of mineral water spas. This was the fault of the miners' union and the Ministry of Health. Doctors neglected their tasks. Health units failed to carry out Decree No 73 for free treatment of disease and free supply of medicines. These units refused to issue medicines on the pretext that they had none to give.(17)

At the same conference Francisc Covaci called for improved medical facilities and pharmacies at Margineanca and Sotanga. Al Fratila expressed the need for a hospital at Comanesti and declared that the present first-aid station was poor.(3) In the Almas Basin first-aid facilities were needed for accidents. In addition, an ambulance was needed to transport injured workers to Cluj. Schitu-Golesti needed a polyclinic, doctors, and dentists. Berevoiesti, Poenari, and Godeni lacked pure drinking water. Engineer Constantin Savescu declared that there was inadequate labor and health protection at Capeni and Codlea, because the labor protection section of the General Confederation of Coal was too bureaucratic.(2)

Emil Klamancsek said that the Petrila mine was in need of medical clinics.(20)

- 11 -

CONFIDENTIAL

25X1

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12. Cultural Work

Cultural work among miners was unsatisfactory, according to reports made at both conferences. For example, a club planned at Sarmasag to be opened 1 May 1952 was not even started. Some areas had no motion pictures. In others, motion pictures were badly scheduled. For example, "Miners of the Donets" played in the area for only one day, and thus was seen by very few miners.(14) Cultural activity in the Schitu-Golesti Basin was inadequate. At Godeni and Berevoiesti there were no clubs. The cultural club center of Poenari was not finished. No books were available to miners. Sorecani and other Cluj mines had no clubs or movies.(2) Clubs and movies were badly needed in Prahova Regiune. Elementary schools were declared necessary in Pescareasca. Schools in Poenari and Berevoiesti were in need of improvement. Political and cultural work in Comanesti was unsatisfactory.(3)

Solutions to Coal Problems

Measures suggested as solutions to the coal-mining problem at the conferences, or applied after the conferences according to reports in the Romanian press surveyed for this report, included the introduction of new mining methods and Stakhanovism to increase labor productivity, higher wages as an incentive to increase production, and the improvement of living conditions for the miners.

1. New Methods

Thousands of miners applied new methods for increased production. These included retreat mining, the Juravlicov-Pokrovski method, the Golovin method of rapidly advancing drifts, and the cyclic graph method of keeping records. The cyclic graph method stimulated the expansion of frontal stopes and development faces in Valea Jiului, Pescareasa, and the Schitul-Golesti Basin.(29)


Groups of miners at Petrila, Aminoasa, and Lupeni in Valea Jiului were able to exceed their quotas by using Soviet methods.(30) Schitu-Golesti successfully introduced Soviet methods.(2) At Capeni miners started the systematic study of Soviet methods to increase production.(25) Teams in Anina exceeded norms by using the cyclic graph method. Leading groups in Sector IV, Lonea, exceeded norms 65 percent in the first half of June 1952 by the use of this method.(14) The cyclic graph method was used at Petrila, Lupeni (22), Petrosani (31). Technician Constant in Damian reported that Sinerig, Doman, Secul, and Anina in Timisoara experienced difficulties because of the use of old methods. Engineer Aurel Horja of Filipesti-de-Padure said that exploitation of lignite had been "barbaric before the introduction of the longwall method. At Sorecani all engineers and technicians were called upon to study Soviet methods, especially the Golovin method which was being introduced at the mines.(2)

In his address to the miners, Gheorghe Dej declared that the Randin method was used in Valea Jiului, the retreat method without intermediary drifts and the Juravlicov-Pokrovski method of reinforcement with metal frames were all used at Petrila. The cyclic graph method for greater labor productivity combined with the longwall method for greater output had been applied at 32 faces in the Valea Jiului.(14)

2. Stakhanovism

In the coal industry as a whole there are 101 Stakhanovite miners. The first Stakhanovites were confirmed in December 1951. The number in Valea Jiului, Sotunga, and other mine areas has grown rapidly since that time.

25X1

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More than 1,900 miners in Valea Jiului, Anina, Comanesti, Filipestii-de-Padure, Sorecani, Ojasca, Petrila, and Sarmasag earned the title of Stakhanovite or leading worker by using the cyclic graph method, the retreat method, or as a result of better training of personnel. In Valea Jiului alone 500 miners became leading workers. Their achievements were popularized daily by newspaper articles and pictures, by radio programs, and in cultural halls.(22)

Groups of miners at Petrila received awards for extra production. The group under Vasile Marian, for example, received 8,393.57 lei in addition to their regular wages. The chief of the group received 1,051.41 lei, including 186.05 as a prize. Miner Ion Iancu received 1,013.83 lei and a prize of 217.97 lei. Car Operator Constantin Petru received a prize of 138.71 lei in addition to wages of 645.20 lei for contributions to transport. Others, however, received no prizes. For example, miners D. Bunduc and R. I. Nuta, lost prizes of 185.72 and 115.59 lei, respectively, for absence without cause.(31)

The following groups at the Tebea mines were successful. Miners of Sector I, under Sub-Engineer Cornel Bocanici fulfilled their plan 174 percent. Groups under Leading Miners Nicolae Ana and Azarie Balatz produced two norms each. Groups and teams of leading miners under David Traian, Constantin Zariu, Lazar Tudoran, Teodor Groza, L. Barastanu, and Teodor Andrei exceeded norms 50-87 percent while cutting in half the time required for mounting cranes.(11)

At Petrila 12 Stakhanovites and 221 leading workers were qualified as a result of competitions and the use of the retreat method and the Juravliov-Pokrovski method.(4) A group under Stakhanovite Gheza Kopetin of Section III, Lonea-Jieti, began work on their 1954 quota in June 1952.(32) In Valea Pălangi, near Filipestii-de-Padure, Miners Ion Cismariu, Nicolae Destfu, Ion Lipianu, and others fulfilled daily quotas 155-175 percent.(17) The team of Leading Worker Stefan Motig was outstanding at Sejul.(13) Twelve groups of miners in Valea Jiului were working on 1953 quotas in July 1952.(33) Stakhanovite Sava Raichicci of Anina was terminating his 1952 quota at the end of May. The youth brigade of Antochie Taroi was starting its 1953 quota at that time.(3) Miner Alexandru Bran pledged that he would become a Stakhanovite.(33)

3. Higher Wages

Gheorghiu-Dej assured the 40 mine representatives at the mid-June conference that the government was actively concerned with the solution of two problems, the improvement of the material well-being of the miners and improvement in the production of coal. He promised a second conference in early July at Petrosani to announce government policy for bringing about the two improvements.(14)

At the second conference, he announced a new wage and prize system, as follows:

In place of the old system of wage by category, a new system of wage by job will be introduced. For example, a miner on a frontal stope will receive 22.12 lei per day for fulfillment of norms, as compared to 17.75 or 19.92 under the old system. A beginner will also receive 22.12 lei per day as compared to 15.68 or 17.76 per day. The greatest wage, 26.53 lei per day will be given to operators of mine cutters and combines to stimulate the use of new techniques. Due to work conditions in Anina, miners there will receive more pay than in Valea Jiului or at lignite mines. Brigade leaders will receive an increase of 30 percent for underground work or for organization of principal jobs. Other brigade leaders will receive 15 percent increases. Brigade leaders in whose units all men fulfill individual norms will receive a 50 percent increase.

25X1

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Miners will receive double pay for exceeding the norms by 10 percent and triple for more than 10 percent, beginning with the first percent. This will replace the old system which called for double pay up to 20 percent and triple for exceeding the norm by more than 20 percent. For underground auxiliary work a premium of 50 percent will be paid for overfulfillment of up to 20 percent and double wages for more than 20 percent. A special system of collective prizes will be introduced for exceeding the number of cycles in the norm under the cyclic graph method.

Masters, engineers, and technicians of the mining sector who contribute directly to the increase in the number of cycles achieved in cutting will receive a prize of 5 percent of the basic monthly salary for each average cycle achieved. A new system of prizes will be introduced for administrative workers and for engineers, technicians, and functionaries. Qualified administrative workers will be awarded 35 percent of their basic salary for fulfillment of the production plan by the sector or face for which they are responsible, and an additional 3 percent for each percentage of overfulfillment. Management personnel will be awarded for fulfilling and exceeding the production plan by sector, mine, or shaft served, on condition that the planned production cost and salary fund be maintained. Engineers and technicians will receive supplementary pay for fulfilling and exceeding the plan for opening and preparing new sources of production.

At mines where coal is extracted for coke, engineers and technicians will be awarded for the achievement of the standard and for reduction of ash content.

4. Measures for Improvement

To achieve a stable cadre for the coal industry, Gheorghiu-Dej continued, 9,000 apartments will be set up under the Five-Year Plan. Of these 5,000 will be built in Valea Jiului. An additional 9,000 rooms and halls for dwellings and cultural work will be set up. New villages and colonies at mines will have food stores, social and cultural institutes, sport, health, club, movie, theater, library, and school facilities. Thus, 21 dispensaries, 6 polyclinics, 2 hospitals, 24 nurseries and kindergartens, 20 schools, and 18 clubs will be established. Vegetable growers will live near mines to provide local food supplies. Special stores will be organized for the exclusive supply of salaried employees of the coal industry with food and industrial products.

To assist in the training of new personnel, grants will be made in advance for households. These will be up to 1,000 lei with monthly payments to be returned in up to 1½ years. Those who wish to build houses will be given loans, free land, and material at cost. Norms for miners with special problems will be reduced as follows: for those who qualify at the place of work, 50 percent during the first month and 25 percent during the next 2 months; for graduates of special and professional schools, 40 percent the first month, 25 percent the second month, and 10 percent the third month.

Miners who qualify new workers at the place of work will receive 250 lei for each individual trained and a reward for fulfillment of norms by workers trained up to 150 lei.

Labor protection measures will include ventilation, lighting, underground and surface sanitary facilities, fire-fighting and emergency equipment, and life-saving teams at large mines or those having gas.(16)

On 4 July, the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers' Party issued a decree incorporating the promises of Gheorghiu-Dej into law.(21)

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25X1

1. Scanteia, 14 Jun 52
2. Viata Sindicala, 1 Jul 52
3. Ibid., 3 Jul 52
4. Romania Libera, 12 Jul 52
5. Scanteia, 25 Jun 52
6. Viata Sindicala, 6 Jul 52
7. Scanteia, 17 Jun 52
8. Ibid., 24 Jun 52
9. Viata Sindicala, 30 Jul 52
10. Scanteia, 26 Jun 52
11. Ibid., 29 Jul 52
12. Viata Sindicala, 31 Jul 52
13. Ibid., 5 Jul 52
14. Scanteia, 21 Jun 52
15. Romania Libera, 9 Jul 52
16. Viata Sindicala, 2 Jul 52
17. Scanteia, 20 Jun 52
18. Ibid., 18 Jun 52
19. Ibid., 19 Jun 52
20. Romania Libera, 17 Jul 52
21. Viata Sindicala, 4 Jul 52
22. Ibid., 26 Jul 52
23. Scanteia, 22 Jun 52
24. Viata Sindicala, 29 Jun 52
25. Ibid., 13 Jul 52
26. Ibid., 30 Jul 52
27. Ibid., 8 Jul 52
28. Ibid., 23 Jul 52
29. Ibid., 15 Jul 52
30. Ibid., 11 Jul 52
31. Ibid., 25 Jul 52
32. Ibid., 28 Jun 52
33. Ibid., 11 Jul 52

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- 15 -

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